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State Cyberterrorism: A Contradiction in Terms?
by Lee Jarvis, Stuart Macdonald and Lella Nouri
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
This article explores findings from a global survey of the terrorism research community to explore whether states 
may be deemed capable of conducting cyberterrorism. The article begins with a brief review of recent literature 
on state terrorism, identifying empirical and analytical justifications for greater engagement with this concept. 
Following a discussion of our research methodology we then make two arguments. First, that there exists 
considerable ‘expert’ support for the validity of the proposition that states can indeed engage in cyberterrorism. 
Second, that whether states are deemed capable of cyberterrorism has implications for subsidiary debates, 
including around the threat that cyberterrorism poses.
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Introduction 
Violence conducted in cyberspace presents important challenges for academic disciplines such as 
International Relations and Law which traditionally work with a state-centric ontology. Two of the most 
obvious of these challenges are the reduced significance of national boundaries within cyberspace – which 
encourages a rethinking of the importance of territorial entities – and the anonymity this offers would-
be belligerents, which requires new forms of knowledge about security threats. This article contributes to 
contemporary debate on a particular category of violence in cyberspace – ‘cyberterrorism’ – asking about the 
significance of actor and non-actor based definitions of this phenomenon. In so doing, it aims to connect 
these debates to the recent upsurge of interest in the concept of ‘state terrorism’ in order to ask whether or not 
states may be deemed capable of committing cyberterrorism, and what might be gained (and indeed lost) in 
such judgements.
In order to do this, the article introduces original empirical data drawn from a survey of the global research 
community on cyberterrorism. The survey was designed to chart areas of disagreement, consensus and 
ambiguity in relation to this term, and received responses from 118 researchers working across 24 different 
countries. In this article we report on findings relating specifically to the question of whether or not 
states can engage in cyberterrorism. These are then connected to researcher views on the threat posed by 
cyberterrorism, and accounts of whether or not cyberterrorism has ever taken place that were given within 
the same survey.
Our engagement with this research question is driven by two dynamics. The first is the continuing 
contestability of the term ‘cyberterrorism’ within academic, legal and other debate (Jarvis and Macdonald 
2014). Establishing – or enquiring into – who can commit cyberterrorism here offers potential for taking 
stock of the state of current opinion on an important generative characteristic of this term. The second driver 
is the rise of recent scholarly research on the nature of ‘state terrorism’ more broadly. Exploring whether 
researchers believe states can commit cyberterrorism might, we suggest, tell us something important about 
the distinctiveness of this phenomenon.
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The article begins with a review of relevant academic literature on state terrorism. Here, we identify two 
arguments for taking the notion of state terrorism more seriously than is sometimes the case. First, is a 
relatively straightforward empirical argument which justifies increased attention to state terrorism due to 
the higher human costs that result from state based violences. Second, is an analytical argument which 
insists that greater attention should be paid to state violence in order to achieve greater consistency in the 
application of existing definitions of terrorism. These arguments, this article suggests constitute a powerful 
attempt to broaden the agenda of terrorism studies. The article’s second section then details our research 
methodology, reflecting on the sampling strategy, distribution of respondents and formulation of our 
questions. A third section introduces qualitative and quantitative data from answers to the three questions 
on which we here focus. The article concludes by pointing to the importance of these findings for the state 
terrorism debate, and more specifically for a (re)thinking of the rationale behind the state/non-state actor 
divide in terrorism studies.
State Terrorism: Issues and Debates
Recent years have witnessed a fairly dramatic growth of interest in the concept of state terrorism. This has 
been driven, in part, by a series of explicit and powerful critiques of the historical disengagement with the 
state within terrorism studies; a field of research which, for many, has too long prioritised the violences 
of non-state actors (see, for example, Blakeley 2007; Jackson et al 2010). These arguments have drawn 
stimulation from two contemporary developments in particular. The first is the recent ‘critical turn’ in 
terrorism studies (see, for example, Gunning 2007; Jackson 2007; Egerton 2009; Jackson et al 2009; Jackson 
et al 2011) and its attempt to deconstruct this field’s established theoretical and methodological assumptions. 
The second is a concerted hostility toward contemporary counter-terrorism practices associated with the 
post-9/11 ‘war on terrorism’ and its violent excesses. Although this momentum within state terrorism 
research is, therefore, comparatively recent, such work builds on a small number of important earlier 
attempts to re-centre the study of terrorism around the violences of states (see, for example, George 1991; 
Claridge 1996; Chomsky 2001; Chomsky 2002). For new and old alike there are at least two powerful reasons 
for so doing.
The first, and perhaps most common, justification is a simple empirical calculation of the human costs 
of state and non-state violence. State or ‘wholesale’ terrorism, in this line of argument, has brought far 
greater harm to humanity than have the activities of non-state groups; a trend widely acknowledged, if 
not necessarily prioritised, within scholarship on terrorism (for comparison, see Blakeley 2008; Horgan 
and Boyle 2008). As Michael Stohl notes, “the number of victims produced by state terror is on a scale 
exponentially larger than that of insurgent terrorists” (Stohl 2008: 6). Goodin, similarly, in a discussion 
of ‘revolutionary terrorism’, argues that, “…state terrorism is an enormously important subject; it is 
incontestable, for example that state terrorism has claimed many more victims than has terrorism as I define 
it here” (Goodin 2006: 2027). What is important to note, however, is that – for these authors – the liberal 
democracies of the ‘global North’ have been as culpable as the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth-century to 
which we might instinctively turn upon hearing the phrase ‘state terrorism’ (see, for example, Blakeley 2007; 
Blakeley 2009; Primoratz 2004; Gareau 2004). In short, there is, for some, a tremendous disconnect between 
research priorities and empirical realities within scholarship on terrorism.
A second set of arguments for taking state terrorism more seriously are more strictly analytical. In the first 
instance, there are arguments for greater consistency in the application of existing definitions of terrorism 
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(see, for example, Chomsky 1991; Jaggar 2005; Blakeley 2007). Such definitions, approached from this 
perspective, are, in essence, adequate for the capture of a multitude of violences. It is their usage in practice 
– by policymakers and ‘terrorologists’ alike – that limits discussion of state violences within the language 
of terrorism. Here there is much to be gained – in analytical as well as political terms – for refusing the 
temptation toward definitional flexibility (for contrasting perspectives see Richardson 2006; Crenshaw 
and Robinson 2010). In Chomsky’s description of what he terms the ‘literal’ approach to the study of 
terrorism, for example, “…we begin by determining what constitutes terrorism. We then seek instances of 
the phenomenon – concentrating on the major examples, if we are serious – and try to determine causes and 
remedies” (Chomsky 1991: 12; see also Chomsky 2001).This argument for greater consistency is pertinent to 
many, perhaps most, understandings of terrorist violence. A strategy favoured by many working in this area, 
indeed, is to juxtapose official US definitions of the term with its historical engagements in Nicaragua, Chile, 
Cuba and beyond. The argument’s value is more limited, however, where actor-specific clauses are built into 
particular definitions of terrorism such as that employed by the US State Department in which terrorism is 
approached as, “…premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetuated against noncombatant targets 
by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (cited in Whittaker 
2003: 3; see also Stohl 2006). In response to actor-specific understandings of terrorism such as these, an 
alternative argument is often made on behaviouralist grounds: one that suggests that terrorism is a form of 
violence which is separable from its practitioner. Hence, for Jackson et al, for example:
To suggest when state agents engage in the very same strategies as non-state terrorists, such as when 
they blow up civilian airliners (the Lockerbie bombing) or a protest ship (the Rainbow Warrior 
bombing) or plant a series of bombs in public places (the Lavon affair), it ceases to be terrorism is 
effectively the abandonment of scholarly research principles (Jackson et al 2010: 3).
For Teichman, similarly:
….we have to acknowledge that governments often do things, both to their own people, and against 
enemies in peace and war, which share the features of the worst types of revolutionary terrorism. 
State terrorism is characterized by such actions as the kidnapping and assassination of political oppo-
nents of the government by the police or the secret service or the army; imprisonment without trial; 
torture; massacres of racial or religious minorities or of certain social classes; incarceration of citizens 
in concentration camps; and generally speaking government by fear (Teichman 1989: 509).
If we take them together, these arguments constitute a powerful (if still nascent) attempt to broaden the 
agenda of terrorism studies (Jarvis 2009). Minimally, the aim is to extend the study of terrorism beyond 
its traditional, narrow, parameters in order to facilitate the analysis of certain state violences under this 
rubric (for example Gunning 2007). Maximally, where articulated most ambitiously, the ultimate aim is the 
advancement of emancipatory political projects predicated on a refusal to remain silent in the face of any 
(terrorist) violences, whoever their authors (see Blakeley 2008; McDonald 2009; Toros and Gunning 2009). 
Thus, for Jackson et al, for example:
…there are important ethical-normative reasons for retaining the term ‘state terrorism’. For example, 
due to the powerful connotations of the ‘terrorism’ label, its retention as a descriptor of certain forms 
of state violence could be an important means of advancing a progressive political project aimed at 
protecting marginalized and vulnerable populations from indiscriminate and oppressive forms of 
state violence, whether they occur under the rubric of war or counter-terrorism (Jackson et al 2010: 
5).
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With the ground thus prepared for greater engagement with state terrorism, the research agenda of this 
literature to date has focused on attempting to define and typologise this form of violence (Jarvis and Lister 
2014). Engagements with definitional issues often lead to reflection on the core characteristics of state 
terrorism, with the following themes particularly dominant therein: the involvement of state representatives 
in the commission or practice of violence; instrumental or purposive behaviour where acts of violence and 
their victims function as means to future ends; an identifiably communicative or symbolic function; and, 
the experience of terror in a broader population (compare Blakeley 2010 and Raphael 2010). Such reflection 
leads some to define state terrorism as a distinctive form of violence, for example:
…the intentional use or threat of violence by state agents or their proxies against individuals or 
groups who are victimised for the purpose of intimidating or frightening a broader audience (Jackson 
et al 2010: 3).
Or:
Terrorism by states is characterized by official support for policies of violence, repression, and intimi-
dation. This violence and coercion is directed against perceived enemies that the state has determined 
threaten its interests or security. Although the perpetrators of state terrorist campaigns are  
frequently government personnel, and directives do originate from government officials, those who 
carry out the violence are also quite often unofficial agents of the government (Martin, cited in Jack-
son et al 2011: 178).
Others prefer instead to define ‘terrorism’ more inclusively before applying this understanding to the actions 
of states as appropriate. The following, for instance, is the definition employed in Gareau’s account of US 
involvement in state terrorism:
Terrorism consists of deliberate acts of a physical and/or psychological nature perpetrated on select 
groups of victims. Its intent is to mould the thinking and behaviour not only of those targeted groups, 
but more importantly, of larger sections of society that identify or share the views and aspirations 
of the targeted groups or who might easily be led to do so. The intent is to intimidate or coerce both 
groups by causing them intense fear, anxiety, apprehension, panic, dread, and/or horror (Gareau 
2004: 14).
Typologies of state terrorism seek to differentiate the various forms that this phenomenon can take. Michael 
Stohl, for example, distinguishes between overt engagements in coercive diplomacy; covert participation in 
assassinations, coups, and the like; and, surrogate activities, whereby assistance is offered to a secondary state 
or insurgent organisation engaging in terrorist violence (Stohl 1984). Blakeley, more recently, separates state 
perpetration and state sponsorship of terrorism (Blakeley 2009). She also, moreover, distinguishes “limited 
state terrorism” which is targeted at a specific, narrow audience, from “generalised” state terrorism, which 
works to target entire populations (Blakeley 2009: 44). Although (as we might expect) no single, universally 
accepted typology of state terrorism exists (Primoratz 2002), these discussions do remind us that the 
terrorism of states can take myriad forms, and use myriad techniques and technologies. With this in mind, 
we proceed now to our discussion of whether states can commit cyberterrorism and what responses to this 
may mean for the literature discussed in this section. First, however this article outlines the methodology 
used to collect the empirical data on ‘expert’ opinion on cyberterrorism.
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Methodology
Our attempt to contribute to these ongoing discussions around the phenomenon of state terrorism draws 
from a recent empirical research project on cyberterrorism. This research made use of an ‘expert survey’, 
which was distributed to over six hundred members of the global research community between June and 
November 2012. Respondents to the survey were identified using a purposive – hence non-probabilistic 
– sampling strategy with four primary strands. The first of these was a targeted literature review search to 
identify researchers who have published on cyberterrorism within peer-reviewed journals, monographs, 
edited books, or other literature. This was completed using the main catalogue of the British Library, as well 
as 47 other online databases[1]. Our search was limited to outputs that had been published on or after 1 
January 2004.
The second strand was to target active researchers within the terrorism research community more widely. 
Whilst these individuals may not have published on cyberterrorism specifically, their knowledge of the 
major debates around terrorism meant they would be well-positioned to contribute to this research. Thus, 
individuals that had published in any of the following four journals since January 1st 2009 were added to the 
sample: Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Critical Studies on Terrorism, and, 
Perspectives on Terrorism. Members of the editorial boards of these journals (as of August 1st 2012) were also 
added, given their similarly prominent standing within terrorism research.
The third strategy was a ‘snowball method’ in which we contacted potential respondents who were explicitly 
identified to us by individuals who had already completed the survey. The fourth was via two mailing lists 
maintained by British academic associations: the Terrorism and Political Violence Association[2], and the 
British International Studies Association Critical Terrorism Studies Working Group[3]. Although there was, 
of course, overlap in the individuals identified in our four strategies, these latter two methods engendered far 
fewer responses than did our initial literature review searches.
The use of a purposive, non-probabilistic, sampling strategy was, we argue, appropriate to the survey’s 
ambitions. Whilst it involves sacrificing any strict claim to statistical representativeness, this may be defended 
given the nature of the population in whom we were interested: the terrorism research community. Where 
the boundaries of this community lie, and who may be considered a legitimate member of it, are, of course, 
entirely contestable. Moreover, as with any epistemic community – indeed, perhaps more than many – the 
field of terrorism research is, by its nature, fluid and porous. Individuals enter and leave according to their 
evolving research interests, and any effort to capture opinion therein can offer only a brief and temporary 
snapshot of a dynamic enterprise. In this sense, the sacrifice of strict representativeness in our study of 
researchers is justified given that no discernible, definitive, population could reasonably be said objectively to 
exist.
A total of 118 responses from researchers working in 24 countries across six continents were generated 
by our survey. Of the 117 responses that provided geographical information to us, our sample had a 
majority of respondents working in the United States of America and the United Kingdom: 41 (35% of the 
total) and 32 (27%) respectively. The next largest sites were Australia (7 respondents, 6%) and Canada (4 
respondents, 3%). This weighting toward anglophonic countries is unfortunate, but unsurprising, given the 
traditional anglocentricism of terrorism research (Stump and Dixit 2013). In terms of professional status, 
the distribution of our respondents was skewed toward permanent and temporary academic staff as follows: 
Academic Staff (Permanent): 75 (64%); Academic Staff (Temporary): 16 (14%); Research Student: 9 (8%); 
Independent Researcher: 11 (9%); Retired: 2 (2%); and, None of the Above: 5(4%). In terms of disciplinary 
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background, finally, our sample described themselves in the following way, with several researchers self-
identifying with more than one academic discipline: Political Science/International Relations: 69 (50%); 
Psychology/Anthropology: 20 (15%); Engineering/Computer Science/Cyber 17(12%); Law/Criminology: 15 
(11%); Literature/Arts/History: 9 (7%); Independent Researchers/Analysts: 5 (4%); and, Economics/Business: 
2 (1%).
Our survey employed a combination of open-ended and closed questions designed to generate quantitative 
and qualitative data. Twenty questions were included in total. These focused on the following: demographic 
information; definitional issues around terrorism and cyberterrorism; the cyberterrorism threat; countering 
cyberterrorism; and, views of current research on this phenomenon, including the major challenges facing 
contemporary scholars. To encourage as high a completion rate as possible, the questionnaire was made 
available in two formats: an online survey and a word processing document. In the following section, this 
article turns to the findings of the survey in relation to the concept of state cyberterrorism and the impact 
this has on responses to questions on the significance and existence of the cyberterrorism threat.
Findings and Analysis
The first question of relevance from our survey – numbered Question 13 – asked respondents, ‘In your 
view, can states engage in cyberterrorism?’ A free text box was provided for responses, in order to allow 
respondents to develop and explain their answers. In total, the question was answered by 109 respondents 
(response rate: 92%). Answers were subsequently analysed and coded using the following five categories: yes 
(unqualified); yes (qualified); other; no (qualified); and, no (unqualified). As chart 1 demonstrates, a total of 
83% of respondents agreed that states can potentially engage in cyberterrorism. Moreover, the vast majority 
of these respondents offered unqualified agreement.
Chart 1: Can states engage in cyberterrorism?
When explaining their view that states can engage in cyberterrorism, several respondents explicitly rejected 
any attempt to distinguish between state and non-state actors. One respondent, for example, argued that: ‘Any 
social actor with sufficient knowledge, means and intent can utilise any particular tactic, be it cyberterrorism 
or anything else, be they states or any other social entity’[4]. Another, drawing on similarly behaviouralist 
reasoning, stated: ‘By definition all forms of terrorism are a tactic open to all and therefore no individual 
or entity is exempt from the option of using this tactic’[5]. Others still drew analogy with alternative forms 
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of terrorism, arguing that since states can engage in offline terrorism there is no reason why states cannot 
also engage in cyberterrorism[6]. In fact, one respondent went so far as to suggest that, without state 
involvement, the technological complexities render cyberterrorism impossible[7]. By contrast, there were 
other respondents who – whilst agreeing that states can engage in cyberterrorism – described states’ potential 
involvement in more limited terms. In their opinion, a cyber-attack would only constitute cyberterrorism 
if state actors played no more than a supporting or facilitative role. For example, one respondent answered: 
‘Only as state sponsors of terrorist groups’[8], whilst others referred to the role of the state as a place to 
‘harbour’[9] or ‘support’[10] non-state actors who launch cyberterrorist attacks.
There were other respondents who answered affirmatively to this survey question, yet qualified their answer 
by querying whether cyberterrorism is the most appropriate label for cyber-attacks perpetrated by state 
actors. Like some of the respondents mentioned in the previous paragraph, some of these individuals drew 
an analogy with traditional forms of terrorism. But unlike those mentioned above, these respondents asserted 
that offline terrorists are conventionally regarded as non-state actors. Hence one respondent answered: ‘Yes 
[states can engage in cyberterrorism], although the standard definition of terrorism rules out state action 
(so Hiroshima isn’t formally an act of terrorism)’[11]. Similarly, another answered: ‘Yes, just like states can 
engage in terrorism, however the standard definition of terrorism does focus on non-state armed groups 
only, leaving terrorist behaviour of states out of the equation’[12]. This respondent went on to suggest that 
state cyberterrorism should instead be labelled as a crime against humanity. Others also suggested alternative 
labels. One commented: ‘In effect [states can engage in cyberterrorism], even if it should be more carefully 
labelled as espionage/sabotage’[13], whilst another observed that: ‘States can engage in the act of terrorism, 
including cyberterrorism (though we still call them states, not terrorists)’[14].
A further significant finding from our survey is that a number of respondents drew on empirical reasoning 
similar to that discussed in the above literature review to argue that there exists a greater threat of state 
cyberterrorism than non-state cyberterrorism. One went so far as to suggest that: ‘[state cyberterrorists] 
are the greatest threat, and make non-government sources of this threat nearly inconsequential in 
comparison’[15]. The most common reason respondents offered for this view was that states have access 
to far greater resources and capabilities than non-state actors[16]. Others pointed out that cyberterrorism 
is likely to prove attractive to states because of the difficulties of attribution and concomitant potential 
for anonymity. As one respondent remarked, states engage in cyberterrorism ‘because of the ease with 
which a state operator can mask itself online’[17]. In fact, several respondents claimed that states already 
engage in cyberterrorism[18], with a number of examples being offered in support of this assertion. The 
most commonly cited of these was Stuxnet[19] with other suggested examples including the cyber-attacks 
on Estonia[20] and Georgia,[21] attempted attacks on the US by China and North Korea[22] and ‘acts 
perpetrated by Russia and China’[23].
As chart 1 showed, there were a total of 17 respondents (15%) who said that states cannot engage in 
cyberterrorism. In the opinion of a number of these respondents, the concept of state cyberterrorism is 
simply a misnomer. Different reasons were offered in support of this view. The most common reason was that 
terrorism is, by its very nature, a non-state activity[24]. If the perpetrator is a state actor, then the conduct 
is cyberwarfare[25] or cyber espionage[26], not cyberterrorism. Second, one respondent suggested that 
cyber-attacks orchestrated by state actors may not be terroristic in nature. Using Stuxnet as an example, 
this respondent argued that it ‘was not used in a way that appears intended to create terror. These acts are 
probably best thought of as politically or strategically motivated sabotage’[27]. Lastly, one respondent argued 
that it is mistaken to talk of state cyberterrorism because cyberterrorism itself is a misnomer, despite the 
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fact that, ‘Cyberattacks and espionage which originate from states certainly do exist’[28]. Meanwhile, there 
were other respondents that were willing to accept the concept of state cyberterrorism in principle, but who 
nonetheless answered no to the survey question on the basis that it is preferable to use a different label[29]. 
As one explained, ‘actions by states are best viewed in terms of warfare/coercive foreign policy. Reserving the 
term [cyberterrorism] for non-state actors (even if sponsored by states) affords a certain degree of analytical 
clarity’[30]. 
Finally, it is important to note that respondents’ views on the state cyberterrorism question had a discernible 
impact on their answers to other important questions, particularly surrounding the significance of 
the cyberterrorist threat. Chart 2 shows the answers to question 10 of our survey – ‘In your view, does 
cyberterrorism constitute a significant threat?’ – for three groups: all respondents; those respondents for 
whom states can engage in cyberterrorism; and, those respondents who argued that states cannot engage 
in cyberterrorism. 60% of researchers who said that states can engage in cyberterrorism also believed that 
cyberterrorism poses a significant threat. This figure was considerably lower for those who said that states 
cannot engage in cyberterrorism, at 47%. Similarly, only 15% of those who said that states can engage in 
cyberterrorism opined that cyberterrorism is not a significant threat, compared to 41% of those who said that 
states cannot engage in cyberterrorism.
Chart 2: Does cyberterrorism pose a significant threat?
A similar pattern is evident in chart 3, which shows the answers of the same three groups of respondents to 
question 11 of our survey: ‘do you consider that a cyberterrorism attack has ever taken place?’. 69% of those 
who said that states cannot engage in cyberterrorism believed that no cyberterrorist attack has ever occurred 
– compared to 44% of those who said that states can engage in cyberterrorism.
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Chart 3: Do you consider that a cyberterrorist attack has ever taken place?
So, just as an individual’s view on whether cyberterrorism should be conceived in narrow terms (as a terrorist 
attack which has computers as its means and/or target) or broad terms (as any form of online terrorist 
activity) affects that individual’s assessment of the cyberterrorism threat (Jarvis et al 2014), so too does an 
individual’s view of whether states can engage in cyberterrorism.
Concluding Remarks
Our survey revealed general agreement that states have perpetrated cyberattacks, with respondents 
offering a number of examples including Stuxnet and the attacks on Estonia and Georgia. This article has 
raised the question of how we should conceive of these attacks. Should they be understood as instances of 
cyberterrorism perpetrated by state actors? Or should we employ a different label, and reserve the term 
cyberterrorism for non-state actors? Answering these questions requires consideration of two issues. First, is 
it possible to speak of state cyberterrorism, or is the term oxymoronic? And, second, if it is possible to speak 
of state cyberterrorism, should we do so?
As explained previously, perhaps the most common justification for employing the term state terrorism in 
discussions of offline violences is the empirical claim that historically states have inflicted more harm than 
non-state actors. The same appears to hold true in the cyber realm, in that a number of our respondents 
pointed out that most or all of the large-scale cyberattacks to date have been perpetrated by state actors. In 
fact, it has been argued that from a cost-benefit perspective it is unlikely that non-state terrorists will attempt 
to launch Stuxnet-like cyberattacks at any point in the foreseeable future (Conway 2014; Al-Garni and Chen 
2015). But whilst the majority of our respondents suggested that states can commit acts of cyberterrorism, 
there were also dissenting voices. In fact, even some of those that said that states can commit acts of 
cyberterrorism qualified their answers by suggesting that another label might be more apt.
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The second set of arguments that we outlined previously for engaging with the concept of state terrorism 
were analytical in nature. Our findings suggest that, as noted above, the argument that existing definitions 
of terrorism should be applied with greater consistency is of limited utility. The argument presupposes that 
definitions of terrorism are not actor-specific. But whilst a number of our respondents explicitly rejected any 
attempt to distinguish between state and non-state actors, there were others who insisted on the importance 
of this distinction, claiming that terrorism is by definition a non-state activity. For the same reason, the 
alternative argument – that terrorism is a form of violence which has nothing to do with its practitioner – is, 
for these respondents at least, equally problematic.
In summary, the diversity of opinions offered by our respondents demonstrates that there is nothing 
inherent in the concept of terrorism that requires a particular answer to the question of whether states can 
commit terrorist acts. The choice of definition, and of typology, is a political one. Our findings do suggest, 
however, that the dominant view within the research community at present is that states can commit acts 
of cyberterrorism. The cyber realm thus presents a challenge to the traditional view that emphasises the 
distinction between state and non-state actors and lends weight to the growing interest in the concept of state 
terrorism.
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Notes
[1] The complete list is as follows: ACM Digital Library; Anthropoligical Index Online; Applied Social 
Sciences Index and Abstracts; Bibliography of British & Irish History; BioMed Central Journals; British 
Humanities Index (CSA); British Periodicals (XML); Business Source Complete (EBSCO); CINAHL Plus 
(EBSCO); Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (Wiley); Education Resources Information Centre; 
Emerald; HeinOnline; HMIC (Ovid); IEEE Xplore; INSPEC (Ovid); International Bibliography of the 
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Social Sciences; IOP Journals Z39; JISC Journals Archives; JSTOR; Kluwer Law Journals; Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science (Springer Link); Lexis Library; MathSciNet (AMS); Medline (EBSCO); MLA International 
Bibliography; Oxford Journals; Periodicals Archive online; Philosopher’s Index (Ovid); Project Muse; 
Proquest Business Collection; PsycARTICLES (Ovid); PsycINFO (Ovid); PubMed; Royal Society Journals; 
SAGE Journals Online; Scopus (Elsevier); Social Care Online (SCIE); Springer Link (Metapress); Taylor & 
Francis Online; Web of Knowledge (Cross Search); Web of Knowledge (ISI); Web of Science (Cross Search); 
Web of Science (ISI); Westlaw; Wiley Interscience; and, Zetoc.
[2] For further information on the association, please see: http://tapva.com/.
[3]For further information on this working group, see: http://www.bisa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=93&catid=37&Itemid=68.
[4] R65.
[5] R8.
[6] R6, R62.
[7] R31.
[8] R49. Similarly, R90 stated: ‘If states sponsor non-state groups to do cyberattacks, then that could easily be 
described as states (indirectly) engaging in cyberterrorism’.
[9] R59.
[10] R33.
[11] R75.
[12] R106.
[13] R99.
[14] R78.
[15] R15.
[16] R30, R45.
[17] R20. R10 also commented, ‘Of course [states can engage in cyberterrorism], but they are likely to have 
their participation hidden’.
[8] In response to the survey question, R111 wrote ‘Most terrorism, including cyberterrorism, is conducted 
by states’, whilst R102 simply wrote ‘They already do’.
[9] R16, R27, R45, R80.
[20] R51, R69.
[21] R69.
[22] R85.
[23] R37.
[24] R3, R9, R52, R55, R71, R83, R87, R108.
[25] R3, R9, R52, R71, R83.
[26] R26, R83, R87.
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[27] R87.
[28] R26.
[29] R1, R63, R64, R73.
[30] R1.
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